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Two studies examined folk concepts of the good life. Samples of college students (N = 104) and 
community adults (N = 264) were shown a career survey ostensibly completed by a person rating 
his or her occupation. After reading the survey, participants judged the desirability and moral 
goodness of the respondent’s life, as a function of the amount of happiness, meaning in life, and 
wealth experienced. Results revealed significant effects of happiness and meaning on ratings of 
desirability and moral goodness. In the college sample, individuals high on all 3 independent 
variables were judged as likely to go to heaven. In the adult sample, wealth was also related to 
higher desirability. Results suggest a general perception that meaning in life and happiness are 
essential to the folk concept of the good life, whereas money is relatively unimportant. 
Research on subjective well-being (SWB) has sought to identify those variables associated with 
leading a satisfying life. It is an interesting characteristic of the SWB literature that much of this 
work concerns variables that are not related to happiness − often, variables commonly assumed 
to bring happiness are found to have little value empirically. For instance, in a review of the 
research on happiness, Myers and Diener (1995) concluded that knowing a person’s sex, income, 
race, or age gives little clue about how happy he or she is. Myers and Diener closed their review 
by calling for more research in the area of happiness to help people “rethink their priorities” and 
better understand how to build a world that “enhances human wellbeing” (p. 17). This statement 
conveys a worthwhile sentiment but it assumes, without empirical support, that people don’t 
know what it takes to make a good life. That is, findings with regard to the lack of relation 
between money and SWB are counterintuitive only if researchers assume that there is a general 
belief that money does buy happiness. The purpose of the current studies was to investigate folk 
concepts of the good life. How do people weigh characteristics of a life in making a judgment 
about its overall value? 
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A variety of thinkers from a broad range of disciplines have puzzled over what it is that makes a 
good life. Aspects of the life well-lived that are frequently proposed include the importance of 
happiness, a sense of purpose, wisdom, creativity, a philosophy of life, achievement, and the 
experience of love (Allport, 1961; Becker, 1992; Coan, 1977; Rogers, 1961; Russell, 1930/1958; 
Ryff, 1989a). The ways in which individuals answer the question of what makes a life good are 
undeniably shaped by history and culture (cf. Coan, 1977; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Schweder, 
1993). It is important to note, for instance, that concern for internal states such as happiness and 
personal fulfillment may be peculiarly Western and modern concerns (cf. Baumeister, 1987; 
Coan, 1977). Given the importance of culture and history in definitions of the good life, we 
selected three variables that have been the subject of attention and debate in Western notions of 
“the good life”: happiness, meaning in life, and money. 
Happiness, meaning in life, and money may all contribute to the good life, but using this term 
ultimately begs the question “What is good?” From the broad range of meanings of”good,” we 
chose to study two types of goodness: desirability and moral goodness. We defined the 
desirability of a life as its perceived quality, whether one would like to have the life, and how 
much the life reflected the good life. With regard to moral goodness, we asked participants to 
judge how good and moral a person was, but also to rate how likely the person was to go to 
heaven. 
Many religions include the concept of an afterlife and many believe in the existence of a final 
reward (heaven) or punishment (hell). A recent U.S. News & World Report survey of 1,000 
Americans found that 80% believed in some kind of afterlife, 67% believed in heaven, and 52% 
believed in hell (“Oprah,” March 31, 1997. Only 8% of those surveyed seriously doubted the 
existence of heaven, whereas 17% seriously doubted the existence of hell. A survey of Britons 
found that 50% of those surveyed believed in heaven, whereas 25% believed in hell (“Church 
panel,” 1996). Given the rather widespread belief in an afterlife and final judgment, we thought 
that there was no more straightforward way to inquire about moral goodness than to simply ask 
participants if the target was likely to go to heaven. In asking this question, we relied completely 
on participants’ intuitive ideas of the afterlife and on their willingness to cast such a judgment. 
Our hypotheses for desirability ratings were driven by the relations of the independent variables 
to SWB in the research literature and by research on the content of human goals. Because 
attempts to answer questions of moral or spiritual nature are essentially culturally and 
historically bound, our hypotheses with regard to issues related to the moral or spiritual value of 
happiness, meaning, and money were made in a particular context. We conducted these two 
studies in Dallas, Texas, and therefore our hypotheses were drawn, to some extent, from Western, 
Judeo-Christian notions of moral goodness. 
 
Happiness 
The importance of happiness in determining the quality of a life is difficult to question, from a 
Western view. The whole point of living happily ever after is living happily ever after. Aristotle 
argued that goals are valued only to the extent that they relate, ultimately, to happiness. It has 
been argued that SWB research has equated happiness with the good life (cf. Ryff & Singer, 
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1998). Research on life goals and wishes confirmed that seeking happiness is a common desire. 
Richards (1966) found that happiness was a common goal among college students. Schwartz and 
Bilsky (1987) identified “enjoyment” as a central dimension of human values. The wish for 
happiness was a “top three” wish among participants in a study by King and Broyles (1997). 
Clearly, people want to be happy. 
A provocative question that has not been examined in research on SWB is the relative 
importance of happiness, per se, in determining one’s quality of life. People can sacrifice 
happiness for other goals yet still maintain a sense of fulfillment. Becker (1992) acknowledged 
this dilemma in his comprehensive review of the characteristics philosophers have associated 
with the good life. There are clearly individuals (e.g., the Marquis de Sade) whose lives were 
driven primarily by hedonistic desires for self-fulfillment but were so devoid of any other value 
that we would never call them’ ‘good.” In contrast, history is rich with examples of heroic 
individuals who sacrificed personal happiness for higher ends, whose lives could hardly be called 
happy ones (Becker, 1992). Although there might be some agreement that these lives were good, 
there remains some question as to whether such lives would be desirable. 
Morally speaking, happiness presents an ambiguous case. Although there is no reason to assume 
that happiness is morally bad, there is a common Judeo-Christian notion that earthly suffering 
may earn one heavenly rewards. Thus, one might expect happiness to relate negatively to 
judgments of moral character. This line of reasoning is contradicted however, if one considers 
the place of happiness not only as one of the goods in life but also as a by-product of being a 
“good person.” A happy life may be a manifestation of following God’s will (cf. Weber, 
1930/1976). Happiness may also be viewed as a reflection of a clear conscience, suggesting that 
happiness might relate to heightened judgments of goodness. 
 
Meaning in Life 
Meaning in life typically involves having a goal or a sense of unified purpose (Baumeister, 1991; 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Ryff, 1989a, 1989b). Research has identified meaning in life as a strong 
correlate of SWB (e.g., Antonovsky, 1988; Ryff, 1989a, 1989b; Shek, 1994; Zika & 
Chamberlain, 1987, 1992) and as a unifying theme in philosophical treatments of the good life 
(Becker, 1992; Ryf-f & Singer, 1998). Research on generativity, the sense that one has left a 
meaningful legacy for the future, also supports the notion that experiencing a sense of purpose is 
a vital part of SWB (McAdams & de St. Aubin, 1992; Mc- Adams, de St. Aubin, & Logan, 
1993). Becker (1992) included “meaningful opportunity” and “meaningful activity” as 
characteristics of the good life. Research on the content of human goals supports the idea that 
people do seek a sense of meaning. Richards (1966) found that a common goal was to “find a 
real purpose in life.” It is important to note that a person may suffer greatly and still possess a 
strong sense of purpose (Frankl, 1985). 
With regard to moral goodness, it seems clear that devoting one’s life to a meaningful purpose, 
particularly one that benefits others, would be considered morally good. To some extent, a 
poverty-filled life that is rich in meaning, if not in personal happiness, would best represent the 
New Testament ideal. The example of Mother Teresa is clearly appropriate: Her daily existence 
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was filled with objectively gruesome tasks, yet her life’s work was undoubtedly meaningful and 
fulfilling. 
Money 
A final independent variable to be considered is money. Surprisingly, beyond being able to 
afford life’s basic needs, additional income has little effect on happiness. One study found the 
correlation between income and happiness to be a mere. 12 (Diener, Sandvik, Seidlitz, & Diener, 
1993). Diener, Horwitz, and Emmons (1985) found that the very wealthy were a little happier 
than others. In a study of lottery winners, Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman (1978) found 
that winning a large sum of money resulted in only a temporary increase in SWB. Money might 
best be seen as a means to an end rather than an end in itself. In Diener et al.’s (1985) study, 
participants tended to agree with the statement that money could contribute to happiness or 
unhappiness, depending on how one used it. Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas agreed that money as 
an end in itself was dehumanizing (Lamb, 1992). These notions have been supported by 
empirical research demonstrating the valuing of material wealth over other ends to be associated 
with poorer psychological functioning (Kasser & Ryan, 1993, 1996). 
Research has indicated that money doesn’t buy happiness. The question remains, “Do people 
think that it does?” King and Broyles (1997) found the wish for money to be quite common in a 
sample of college students. Wicker, Lambert, Richardson, and Kahler’s (1984) analysis of 
human motives identified economic status as one of the underlying clusters. Despite the potential 
dark side of seeking wealth, lottery receipts alone would seem to indicate that wealth is widely 
viewed as desirable. To paraphrase a common saying (about relationships), is it as easy to love a 
rich life as a poor one? 
The moral and spiritual consequences of material wealth have been explicitly addressed in 
religious contexts. In the New Testament, Jesus warned his disciples that, “It is as easy for a 
camel to pass through the eye of a needle as it is for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God” 
(Matthew 19:23). Thus, one might expect wealth to relate negatively to judgments of moral 
goodness. This line of reasoning is contradicted, however, by the Protestant work ethic that 
presents earning money as an ethical duty. In his landmark analysis of the Protestant work ethic, 
Weber (1930/1976) suggested that earthly economic success might be taken as a comforting cue 
that God looked upon one favorably. In addition, career success may be viewed as an indicator of 
ethical goodness, in the sense that one is successful at one’s “calling” and is therefore following 
“God’s will” (e.g., Weber, 1930/1976). 
It is noteworthy that in the U.S. News & World Report survey (“Oprah,” 1997), more than half of 
the respondents (51%) endorsed the belief that “doing good deeds” was what would get a person 
into heaven, tending to speak against the idea of a widespread belief in predestination and 
salvation through God’s grace. Interestingly, survey respondents were also asked to rate the 
likelihood of 15 prominent individuals going to heaven. Eighty-seven percent of the respondents 
believed themselves to be likely to go to heaven; 79% thought Mother Teresa would likely go to 
heaven, followed by Oprah Winfrey at 66%, and Michael Jordan at 65%. Mother Teresa was 
arguably the prototypical selfless person, having no material wealth and devoting her life to a 
meaningful cause. Still, the other examples (Oprah Winfrey and Michael Jordan) provide some 
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evidence that career achievement and economic success do play a role in judgments of heavenly 
reward. 
Overview and Predictions 
In two studies, participants were asked to carefully examine a “Career Survey” (see Appendix) 
that had ostensibly been completed by someone rating his or her own occupation. Responses of 
these fictional respondents were manipulated to be relatively happy or not, to be experiencing a 
great deal of meaning or not, and to be relatively wealthy or not. In the low-money condition, the 
respondent was not portrayed as poverty stricken, but rather as lower middle class (making 
$20,000 to $30,000 per year, compared with over $100,000 in the high-money condition) in 
order to reflect the income differences typically examined in SWB research. Participants rated 
the desirability of the respondent’s life and the moral goodness of that life. 
With regard to the desirability of a life, we expected folk concepts of the good life to conform to 
the literature on SWB. A life high in meaning and high in happiness was expected to be preferred. 
Money was not predicted to be relevant to desirability. With regard to moral goodness, we 
predicted a main effect for meaning, such that the meaningful life would be evaluated as morally 
good. With regard to the effects of happiness and wealth on moral goodness, no clear predictions 
were made. On the basis of the Protestant work ethic, we might expect that happy, wealthy 
individuals would be judged as morally good. On the other hand, on the basis of the “suffering 
servant” portrayed in the New Testament (and in the life of Mother Teresa), we might expect that 
earthly rewards would be negatively related to judgments of moral goodness. In this case, we 
expected a three-way interaction, such that the suffering, poor individual who experienced 
meaning would be judged as most likely to go to heaven. 
Study 1 
Method 
Participants. One hundred four college students (19 men, 81 women, 4 not reporting) 
participated in this study to earn extra credit in upper level psychology classes. Age ranged from 
18 to 42 years (M = 21.66, SD = 3.49). 
Materials and procedure. Participants were asked to carefully examine a questionnaire that 
ostensibly had been completed by a participant in a study of “career satisfaction.” We used a 
“career survey” in order to make the survey as concrete as possible. The importance of job 
satisfaction to life satisfaction is well-established (cf. Myers & Diener, 1995). Although the 
survey participants examined referred to aspects of the respondent’s job, the questions 
participants answered referred to the respondent’s life in general. 
The career survey was designed so that all fictional targets had received a Bachelor of Arts 
degree, and no information about sex or age was given. Participants were randomly assigned to 
conditions in a 2 (high vs. low happiness) × 2 (high vs. low meaning) × 2 (high vs. low money) 
between-subjects design. Survey responses were manipulated so that for some participants the 
respondent was earning greater than $100,000 per year, and for some the respondent was earning 
between $21,000 and $30,000 per year. The survey included three questions about the degree of 
happiness experienced in the respondent’s job. These items included “I truly enjoy going to work 
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everyday,” “At my job, I feel happy most of the time,” and “My job involves a lot of hassles.” 
These items had been rated on a scale ranging from 1 (completely false of me) to 5 (completely 
true of me). In the high-happiness condition, these items were rated 5, 4, and 1, respectively. In 
the low-happiness condition, the items were rated 1, 2, and 5, respectively. Mixed in with the 
happiness items were three items about the amount of meaning the respondent experienced in his 
or her job. These items included “In my job I really feel like I am touching the lives of people,” 
“My work is very rewarding and I find it personally meaningful,” and “My work will leave a 
legacy for future generations.” In the high-meaning condition, these items were rated 5, 5, and 4, 
respectively. In the low-meaning condition, they were rated 1, 1, and 2, respectively. 
The dependent measures completed by participants included three questions about desirability 
and three about moral goodness. For desirability, on a Scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely 
much), participants responded to the questions “How much would you like to have this person’s 
life?” and “How much do you think this person is leading ‘the good life’?” Next, on a scale from 
1 (very low) to 10 (very high), participants rated the quality of the respondent’s life. With regard 
to moral goodness, on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely much), participants rated how 
good and how moral they thought the person was. Finally, participants read and completed the 
final rating: 
Many religions and philosophies include the idea of a “final judgment.” If there were 
such a thing as life after death, circle the number that best represents your guess as to 
what this person would experience. 
 
Because religiosity might reasonably be expected to relate to this last measure, participants also 
completed two items tapping the importance of religion in their lives (“How important is religion 
in your life?” and “How important is spirituality in your life?”). Both items were rated on a scale 
from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely much) and the mean of the two ratings was taken as a crude 
measure of religiosity (M = 3.44, SD = 1.23; correlation between the two items = .69, p < .001).  
What Makes a Life Good? 
7 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
Correlations were computed among the dependent measures, and results are shown in Table 12. 
All of the dependent measures were highly correlated, with the desirability measures being 
somewhat more highly correlated than the moral goodness measures. The correlations across the 
two types of measures indicate that participants said that they would like to have the life of a 
person who was moral, good, and going to heaven. Respondents who were judged as having a 
high quality of life were also judged to .be good, moral, and on a path to heaven. Note also that 
participants’ responses to the going-to-heaven question had a grand mean of 6.89, suggesting a 
tendency toward leniency. These ratings spanned the full 1-10 range, with 2 targets judged as 
certain to go to hell and 11 judged as certain to go to heaven. Only 4 participants did not answer 
the final judgment question. 
What makes a life desirable? In order to tap the desirability of a life, we asked participants to 
rate how much they would like to have that life and how much the life reflected the good life (on 
scales ranging from 1 to 5) and to rate the quality of the life (on a scale ranging from 1 to 10). A 
2 (high vs. low happiness) x 2 (high vs. low meaning) x 2 (high vs. low money) multivariate 
analysis of variance (MANOVA) on responses to these three desirability questions revealed 
significant main effects for happiness and meaning, multivariate Fs(3, 94) = 26.13 and 32.68, 
respectively, both ps < .0001, and a significant Happiness x Meaning interaction, multivariate 
F(3, 94) = 3.11, p < .05, for the question “Would you like to have this life?”, F(1, 96) = 9.22, p 
< .001. Means for this interaction, shown in Table 2, indicate that the combination of meaning 
and happiness was preferred significantly more than the alternatives. In addition, the low-
                                                          
2
 Initially, analyses were conducted using sex as a variable. However, sex did not show significant main 
effects, nor did sex interact with any of the other variables in predicting desirability or moral quality of 
life. Therefore, all analyses combine men and women. 
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happiness, low-meaning condition was preferred the least, with the exception of the low-
happiness, high meaning condition. 
With regard to whether the respondent was leading the good life, participants rated the high-
happiness survey as reflecting the good life more so than the low-happiness survey (M = 3.35 vs. 
2.20), F(1, 96) = 56.51, p < .001, and the high-meaning survey as reflecting the good life more 
so than the low-meaning survey (M = 3.44 vs. 2.15), F(1, 96) = 71.86, p < .001. For this 
question, the highest ratings went to the high-happiness, high-meaning, high-money life (M = 
4.15), though no two- or three-way interactions were significant. 
With regard to quality of life, participants rated the high happiness survey as reflecting a higher 
quality of life than the low-happiness survey (M = 6.57 vs. 4.20), F( 1, 96) = 64.74, p < .001, 
and the high-meaning survey as reflecting a higher quality of life than the low-meaning survey 
(M = 6.62 vs. 5.42), F( 1, 96) = 64.52, p < .001. Although the high-happiness, high meaning 
survey received the highest quality of life rating (7.96 vs. 7.92 for high happiness, high-meaning, 
high money), no significant interactions emerged. With regard to the three desirability questions, 
no main effects for money emerged, multivariate F(3, 94) = 0.13. 
Moral goodness. Next, analyses examined the extent to which varying the amount of happiness, 
meaning, and wealth experienced by the respondent influenced judgments of the moral goodness 
of the person. A 2 (high vs. low happiness) x 2 (high vs. low meaning) x 2 (high vs. low money) 
multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was performed on ratings of how good, moral, 
and likely to go to heaven participants had rated the respondent to be, controlling for self-
reported religiosity. Main effects for happiness, multivariate F(3, 89) = 3.89, p < .02, and 
meaning, multivariate F(3, 89) = 16.82, p < .001, were qualified by a significant three-way 
interaction, multivariate F(3, 89) = 3.47, p < .02. This interaction was significant for the 
questions of goodness, F( 1, 96) = 3.51, p < .05, and likelihood of going to heaven, F( 1, 96) = 
6.09, p < .02. 
Cell means for ratings of goodness are shown in Figure 1. Post hoc tests demonstrated that the 
low-happiness, high-meaning, low-money condition (M = 3.86) was rated as higher in goodness 
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than three other groups (all low in meaning): (a) the low-happiness, low-meaning, low-money  
condition, (b) the low-happiness, low-meaning, high-money condition, and (c) the high-
happiness, low-meaning, high-money condition. In addition, the high-happiness, high-meaning, 
high-money condition was rated as higher on goodness than these same three groups (M = 4.15). 
Thus, participants rated the suffering individual who had meaning as being a good person 
(following the “Mother Teresa model”), but in keeping with the Protestant work ethic, they also 
thought that the person who “had it all” was good as well. 
Cell means for ratings of heavenly reward are shown in Figure 2. Post hoc tests revealed that the 
only two means to significantly differ were for high happiness, high meaning, and high money 
versus low happiness, low meaning, and low money, with the person who has it all being judged 
as more likely to find heavenly reward than the individual who has none of life’s goods. These 
ratings of final judgment again conform to a Protestant work ethic view − that earthly success 
may reflect divine grace. Interestingly, the low-happiness, high-meaning, low-money survey was 
not seen as particularly likely to find reward in heaven. 
 
No two-way interactions emerged. With regard to main effects, it is notable that both happiness 
and meaning showed significant main effects for goodness and heavenly reward. Happy 
individuals were judged as higher in goodness (M = 3.05 vs. 3.55), F(1, 96) = 8.77, p < .01, and 
more likely to go to heaven (M = 6.47 vs. 7.29 on a scale from 1 to 10), F( 1, 96) = 6.50, p < .01. 
Individuals pursuing a meaningful life were judged as higher in goodness (M = 2.77 vs. 3.71), 
F( 1, 96) = 38.28, p < .001, and in likelihood of going to heaven (M = 6.22 vs. 7.53), F(1, 96) = 
13.16, p < .01. With regard to ratings of morality, only the main effect for meaning was 
significant, F( 1, 96) = 34.34, p < .001, with the person experiencing a great deal of meaning 
judged as more moral (M = 3.63 vs. 2.72). It is interesting to note that the 2 respondents who 
were given a “1” on the heavenly reward question (i.e., judged as certain to go to hell) were high 
on happiness, high on money, and low in meaning. Among the 11 respondents judged to be 
bound for heaven, 8 were high in meaning, 9 were high in happiness, and 6 were wealthy. 
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To gauge the relative weight of the three independent variables in accounting for variance in the 
ratings of desirability and moral goodness, we found it useful to examine the effect sizes of the 
main effects of these variables. This is particularly convenient because so few interactions were 
significant, rendering these main effects largely interpretable. The multivariate effect size for 
happiness on ratings of desirability was .45 (mean η2 across the three items = .34). For meaning, 
the multivariate effect size for desirability was .50 (mean η2 = .39). Thus, the main effects of 
happiness and meaning were similarly large (Cohen, 1977). With regard to the main effect of 
money, the multivariate effect size was quite low (.01; mean η2 < .01 ). Turning to moral 
goodness questions, for happiness the multivariate effect size was .12 (mean η2 = .06), for 
meaning it was .36 (mean η2 = .35), and for money it was .06 (mean η2 = .019). This examination 
of the effect sizes of the independent variables indicated that meaning and happiness had large 
effects on ratings of desirability, and meaning had a sizable effect on ratings of moral goodness. 
Results of Study 1 indicated that happiness and meaning determined perceptions of the quality of 
a life. Thus, participants’ views of a good life did converge with the view represented in the 
SWB literature. With regard to moral goodness, evidence was mixed. Meaning was consistently 
related to moral goodness, but the interactions shown in Figures 1 and 2 indicated that earthly 
happiness and economic success were also components of a life perceived to be bound for 
heavenly reward. 
An important limitation of Study 1 is that the sample consisted of college students. These 
individuals may underestimate the importance of money due to lack of experience in “the real 
world.” In addition, previous research has highlighted the role of age in conceptions of the good 
life (Ryff, 1989a, 1989b). In order to attempt to replicate these results in a more diverse group 
drawing from a broader age range, Study 2 was undertaken. In this study, the procedures were 
essentially identical to Study 1, except that participants were recruited from offices and public 
places in Dallas, Texas. 
Study 2 
Method 
Participants. Two hundred sixty-four adults in the Dallas community (99 men, 155 women, 10 
not reporting) participated in this study3. 2 Ages ranged from 20 to 85 years (M = 38.72, SD = 
13.21). 
Materials and procedure. Participants were approached by students from an upper level 
psychology course at their workplaces in and around the Southern Methodist University campus, 
as well as throughout the city of Dallas. Student experimenters received extra credit in their 
classes for distributing four questionnaires. Participants were told that the completion of the 
questionnaire would take approximately 5 min and that their responses would be completely 
                                                          
3
 Experimenters were asked to request that participants write their own occupation on the back of the survey sheets. 
Most experimenters neglected to do so, however. From the 35% who did, we can estimate that the participants in 
Study 2 were from very diverse backgrounds-- including unemployed individuals, medical doctors, college 
professors, clerical workers, service personnel, sales people, homemakers, and skilled laborers. 
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anonymous. Materials were identical to those used in Study 1. For the religiosity questions, the 
mean was similar to that reported in Study 1 (M = 3.48, SD = 1.26, interitem r = .64, p < .001). 
Results and Discussion 
Correlations among the dependent measures are reported in Table 34. Dependent measures were 
highly correlated—participants in this sample also tended to rate morally good lives as desirable 
lives. Again, the ratings for the final judgment question ranged from 1 to 10. Five targets 
received a “1,” indicating that they were certain to go to hell, and 13 received a “10,” indicating 
they were certain to go to heaven. 
What makes a life desirable? A 2 (high vs. low happiness) × 2 (high vs. low meaning in life) × 2 
(high vs. low money) MANOVA on responses to the desirability questions revealed significant 
main effects for happiness, multivariate F(3, 251 ) = 28.13, meaning, multivariate F(3, 251 ) = 
34.43, and money, multivariate F(3, 251 ) = 4.52, all ps < .01, but also revealed a Happiness × 
Meaning interaction, multivariate F(3, 251 ) = 3.43, p < .004. As in Study 1, the interaction was 
significant for the question “Would you like to have this life?”, F(1,253) = 7.71, p < .01. Means 
for Sample 2 on this question are shown in Table 4. The high-meaning, high-happiness condition 
was rated significantly higher than all alternatives. The low-meaning, low-happiness condition 
was preferred significantly less than all three alternatives. 
For ratings of whether the respondent was leading the good life, all three main effects were 
significant. Participants rated the happy life as better than the unhappy life (M = 3.15 vs. 2.34), 
F(1, 253) = 45.50, p < .001, the meaningful life as better than the meaningless life (M = 3.25 vs. 
2.18), F( 1,253 ) = 76.99, p < .001, and the wealthy life as better than the “poor” life (M = 2.87 
vs. 2.62), F(1,253) = 4.98, p < .01. The Happiness × Meaning interaction did approach 
significance, F(1,253) = 2.71, p < .10. 
For ratings of quality of life, three significant main effects were observed. A happy life was rated 
as higher in quality than an unhappy life (M = 6.09 vs. 4.09), F(1,253) = 68.00, p < .001, and a 
meaningful life was seen as higher in quality than a meaningless life (M = 6.14 vs. 3.87), 
F(1,253) = 87.44, p < .001. The wealthy life was rated as higher in quality than the poor one (M 
= 4.67 vs. 5.45), F(1,253) = 11.34, p < .01. 
Moral goodness. A MANCOVA was performed on the moral goodness questions, controlling for 
self-reported religiosity. Multivariate tests were significant for the main effects of happiness, 
multivariate F(3, 231 ) = 7.47, p < .01, and meaning, multivariate F(3, 231) = 34.42, p < .001. 
No interactions or main effects for money emerged. With regard to goodness ratings, main 
effects were significant for happiness (M = 3.05 vs. 3.50), F(1,233) = 16.26, p < .001, and 
meaning (M = 3.71 vs. 2.77), F(1, 233) = 66.87, p < .001. For ratings of how moral the person 
was, again, main effects for happiness (M = 3.36 vs. 2.94), F(1, 233) = 16.51, and meaning (M = 
3.58 vs. 2.64), F(1,233) = 72.69, p < .001, were significant. Similarly, in judging whether the 
respondent would likely find punishment or reward in the afterlife, two significant main effects 
                                                          
4
 Analyses were initially run using sex as a variable. Sex had a significant main effect on judgments of how good the 
target was—men rated the individual significantly more highly than women, in general, F(1,223) = 8.14p < .01 (M = 
3.45 vs. 3.14). However, sex had no other main effects and no interactions with the other variables, and therefore all 
subsequent analyses included men and women as a whole. 
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emerged, for happiness (M = 6.87 vs. 6.20), F(1,233) = 8.16, p < .004, and meaning (M = 7.30 
vs. 5.66), F(1, 233) = 47.18, p < .001. 
As in Study 1, because of the absence of interactions, the effect sizes for the main effects of the 
independent variables provide a useful basis for comparing the relative impact of each variable 
on the ratings of desirability and moral goodness. For desirability, the multivariate effect size for 
happiness was .25 (mean η2 = .21), for meaning it was .30 (mean η2 = .23), and for money it 
was .05 (mean η2 = .03). With regard to moral goodness, the multivariate effect size for 
happiness was .09 (mean η2 = .06), for meaning it was .31 (mean η2 = .20), and for money it 
was .007 (mean η2 = .002). As in Study 1, these results demonstrate that meaning and happiness 
accounted for sizable portions of the variance in desirability ratings. In addition, meaning tended 
to account for a large portion of variance in judgments of moral goodness, with happiness 
accounting for a significant but somewhat smaller portion of the variance in moral goodness. 
  
Effects of age on judgments. Because of the broader range of age in this sample, we conducted 
analyses to examine the possibility that age interacted with the independent variables to predict 
desirability or moral judgments. Hierarchical regression analyses were performed, regressing the 
dependent measures on the dummy variables of the conditions, the mean deviation score for age, 
and the interaction terms of age and the dummy variables, to test for interactions between age 
and the independent variables. No significant interactions (or main effects for age) were found. 
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General Discussion 
The results of these studies suggest that the folk concept of the good life converges with the 
portrait presented in the literature on SWB. Consistently, meaning and happiness determined the 
desirability of a life. Wealth was largely irrelevant to judgments of the good life by college 
students and was of only limited relevance for community adults. With regard to moral goodness, 
the college sample provided some support for the theory of the moral goodness of the suffering 
individual engaged in meaningful pursuits. However, this sample also tended to see salvation in 
the life that was characterized by meaning, happiness, and wealth. In the community sample, 
such an interaction did not emerge. For both samples, happiness and meaning tended to affect 
ratings of moral goodness. 
In comparing the two samples, the results are remarkably similar. Happy, meaningful lives were 
given the highest “liking” rating in both samples. In contrast to the college sample, in the 
community sample, money consistently increased ratings of desirability. These differences may 
be attributable to the substantial differences in age and life experience of the two samples. The 
students who participated in Study 1 may simply be unaware of the role of money in procuring 
life’s necessities. It might also be that our samples differed in income level and that this 
difference impacted on participants’ ratings of the desirability of the wealthier life. It is notable, 
however, that even in the community sample, in which wealth had a significant main effect on 
desirability, meaning had an effect size 6 times that of money, whereas happiness had an effect 
size 5 times that of money. 
The strong relationship between meaning in life and judgments of desirability and moral 
goodness is not surprising, An important consideration is the degree to which our particular 
means of manipulating meaning may have enhanced ratings of moral goodness. That is, we 
included one item that was specifically generative (“My work will leave a legacy for future 
generations”) and one that was interpersonal in focus (“In my job I really feel like I am touching 
the lives of people”). Creating meaning through service to others is only one way to achieve 
meaning. Contrasting this type of meaning with meaning that is more personally defined (e.g., a 
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suffering, starving artist whose work is never appreciated until after death) may be an interesting 
direction for future research. 
Results with regard to happiness are, perhaps, more surprising. In both samples, happy people 
were judged not only as leading a desirable life but also as good people who were likely to go to 
heaven. One explanation for these results is a just world mentality (Janoff-Bulman & Frieze, 
1983). It may be that participants thought that individuals who were happy, wealthy, and living a 
meaningful life deserved these rewards due to their good works. Happiness may also be 
considered a by-product of leading the good life, rather than a contributor to the good life. Thus, 
in encountering an individual who is happy, participants may have assumed that such a person 
must be doing good things (the just world hypothesis; Janoff-Bulman & Frieze, 1983). These 
results resonate with research showing a positive bias on the part of happy people, who are likely 
to report themselves as more ethically good than the average person (Janoff- Bulman, 1989). 
It is somewhat ironic that although money was irrelevant to judgments of the desirability of a life, 
money played a role in judgments of the likelihood that a person would be rewarded in heaven 
(for the college sample). The results in Figure 2 seem to resonate with the results reported in the 
U.S. News & World Report survey (“Oprah,” 1997) that Oprah Winfrey was perceived as bound 
for heaven. These results seem to map onto the ideals of the Protestant work ethic−that success is 
a moral good. 
The results of Study 1 suggest that television evangelists who present an image of happiness and 
prosperity might well be appealing to people’s views of what a person bound for salvation looks 
like. Television evangelists often present themselves as the picture of happy prosperity− 
appearing on opulent sets and wearing ornate clothes and jewelry. Although the image of earthly 
wealth seems to conflict with the biblical notion of goodness, prosperity nevertheless may play a 
role in judgments of another as likely to find a heavenly reward. 
The survey examined by our participants referred explicitly to the respondent’s job. Future 
research might manipulate the life domain in which meaning, happiness, and material wealth are 
enjoyed in order to determine if life domain interacts with type of benefit to predict judgments of 
goodness. For instance, an individual who works at a meaningless occupation may experience 
meaning through his or her interpersonal relationships, or someone might experience very little 
happiness caring for a gravely ill spouse, but experience happiness at his or her occupation. 
Allowing participants a wider view of the target’s life might provide provocative information 
about the sorts of experiences that are valued in different life domains. 
Three important limitations of these studies must be addressed. First, as stated previously, the 
results of this study are limited to a particular place and time. Participants were drawn from a 
city in the “Bible Belt” of the United States. Responses would be expected to reflect a Western, 
middle class, and largely Christian mentality. Future research should seek to include cross-
cultural data in order to evaluate the generalizability of the current results. Given the previous 
discussion of the cultural underpinnings of beliefs about the good life, results with regard to 
happiness and meaning might be predicted to generalize to other Western, industrialized groups 
but may not be replicable with individuals from Eastern cultures. For instance, Buddhism 
acknowledges the inevitability of suffering, so the issue of happiness would be irrelevant to 
moral goodness in Buddhist cultures (Osborne, 1996). Additionally, more collectivist cultures 
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would be unlikely to view individual success as relevant to the question of what makes a life 
good. 
Even within U.S. or Western samples, a potentially important variable to include would be 
participant religious affiliation. It might be that Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Hindus, Buddhists, 
and atheists differ in terms of the relative weight they give to wealth, happiness, and meaning in 
such judgments, or in their willingness to make such judgments. Recall that in the U.S. News 
survey, many respondents endorsed the idea that good deeds were what earned a person a place 
in heaven. Such a statement is clearly drawn from a more Catholic sensibility than from 
denominations that emphasize the role of grace in salvation. The inclusion of other individual 
difference measures may have clarified the present findings. Measuring socioeconomic status 
would have allowed for a test of this possibility. Other individual differences might also be 
interesting to include in future research. Participants’ levels of SWB might be an interesting 
variable to include, because this would allow for a test of similarity effects in happiness. 
A second potential limitation of the present studies involves the subtlety of the money 
manipulation. Although the money manipulation was kept deliberately moderate (so that the 
poor person was not so much poor as average), this subtlety may have lessened our ability to 
detect differences on this dimension. Thus, participants may have been insensitive to the 
manipulation rather than insensitive to issues of wealth. It might be worthwhile in future studies 
to test this possibility with a variety of levels of income. 
A final important limitation of this study was that a robust component of the good life was not 
included—interpersonal relationships. Research has shown that married people are generally 
happier than unmarried people (Glenn & Weaver, 1988; Inglehart, 1990; Jahoda, 1958; Lee, 
Seccombe, & Shehan, 1991). The importance of intimacy in the good life is well-established (cf. 
Coan, 1977; Ryff & Singer, 1998). Broadening this paradigm to include the respondent’s 
relationship status would certainly strengthen any conclusions we might make. In addition, it 
might be interesting to use a paradigm similar to this one to investigate folk concepts of the good 
relationship. Future studies might ask individuals to evaluate the relative weight of relationship 
characteristics such as material benefits, positive affect, and meaning to relationship desirability. 
The main thrust of these results for research on SWB is that such research ought to turn its 
attention to questions beyond the correlates of happiness. Research needs to focus on 
understanding the behaviors and life choices individuals engage in in search of the good life. The 
present results indicate that people do know what it takes to make a good life. Whether they 
actually put these ideas into action is an important focus for research. It may be that individuals 
make choices they erroneously believe will enhance the experience of meaning in their lives. Or 
it may be that individuals are unable to gauge the degree of happiness and meaning a particular 
life course will promise. Certainly, the amount of money a job will pay is concrete and easily 
understood. How one will feel in the day-to-day enactment of the job is a more complex puzzle. 
A final consideration in this regard is the extent to which perceptions of the good life for another 
person apply to individuals’ perceptions of the good life for themselves. It may be that 
meaningful happy lives are admired and even envied when led by others but that the desire for 
monetary success is seen as more central to the good life for oneself. 
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Conclusions 
The present studies indicate that folk perceptions of the good life include the experience of 
meaning in life and happiness. In addition, in judging the moral goodness of a life, individuals 
are likely to take into account not only the amount of meaningful activity engaged in but also the 
amount of happiness the person enjoys. Compared with wealth, meaning and happiness were 
overwhelmingly more powerful predictors of the value of a life. Placing this research in the 
context of the SWB literature, the current results tend to indicate that the mysteries of a good life 
have not eluded people. Yet, one need only take an informal survey of a daily newspaper or 
nightly news report to see that the good life remains merely a fantasy to many. We do know what 
it takes to make a life good; perhaps more interesting, then, is the fact that we still behave as if 
we did not. 
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